Alessandro Di Lorenzo
Formal verification of security properties for remote attestation protocols.
Rel. Riccardo Sisto, Fulvio Valenza, Simone Bussa. Politecnico di Torino, Corso di laurea magistrale in Ingegneria Informatica (Computer Engineering), 2022
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Abstract
Formal verification refers to a set of techniques based on formal methods, which aim to assess whether a certain formal model is well-defined or that a system satisfies some specific properties. This kind of formal analysis lends itself very well to the use of automated algorithms that help reach the desired outcome in reasonable time. This technique has been successfully applied in the verification of cryptographic protocols in the literature, to evaluate their security in case of hostile actors interference; the main advantage of this analysis is its ability to identify potential vulnerabilities that would not be intuitively detectable, as was the case for widely used protocols which believed secure for years.
A possible application of cryptographic protocols is to protect the process of Remote Attestation, which is a key component of a trusted computing environment
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