Davide Muscia
Implementation and validation of a hardware countermeasure against fault injection attacks.
Rel. Maurizio Martina, Guido Masera. Politecnico di Torino, Master of science program in Electronic Engineering, 2024
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Abstract
Data integrity in a processor is crucial to ensure that computations are processed without errors, preserving the consistency and reliability of the results. This is especially important in applications such as automotive, aerospace, and other critical sectors. Modern processor architectures have been shown to be vulnerable to fault injection attacks, which involve injecting errors into the circuit using simultaneous laser beams that target single or multiple data bits to compromise their integrity and extract sensitive information. This method has proven effective over the past decade through the observation of faulty behavior. Designing countermeasures against fault injection attacks has become essential to ensure data integrity, particularly with the increasing use of open-source implementations such as RISC-V, where the attacker has full knowledge of the architecture.
This work proposes a fault detection methodology called "permutation-based homomorphic tags." It involves providing a redundant hardware implementation that computes arithmetic and logic operations in a permuted domain associated with a specific key
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