Cristina Demontis
"Forensically-aware" steganographic covert channels.
Rel. Andrea Atzeni. Politecnico di Torino, Corso di laurea magistrale in Cybersecurity, 2026
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Abstract
This thesis investigates steganographic covert channels and their forensic de- tection across different system layers. It focuses on two main categories: network based channels, represented by the Silent History Protocol, and memory based channels exploiting cache and DRAM behavior. The work proposes a forensic perspective based not only on the medium used to hide information, but also on the nature of the traces produced by the channel. The analysis distinguishes deterministic, statistical/behavioral, and latent/heuristic traces, with particular attention to the balance between detection capability and forensic explainability. A proof of concept was developed for SHP over ARP and SHP over DNS.
The experiments combine network level monitoring, host level monitoring, and cross layer correlation
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