Federico Rinaudi
On Mitigating Fingerprinting Internet Traffic Attacks: a Case Study on Oblivious DNS over HTTPS (ODoH) with eBPF.
Rel. Alessio Sacco, Guido Marchetto, Flavio Esposito. Politecnico di Torino, Master of science program in Computer Engineering, 2024
Abstract
Website fingerprinting attacks exploit user privacy and expose them to unauthorized tracking, profiling, and exploitation of sensitive activities. Failing to mitigate these attacks risks data leaks, targeted attacks, and the erosion of trust in Internet security and anonymity services. Recently, academia and industry have proposed several solutions to address this problem. One of the most popular solutions to mitigate this problem is to carry DNS traffic over HTTPS connection (DoH). More recently, Oblivious DNS over HTTPS (ODoH) has been proposed to further mitigate website fingerprinting attacks. While HTTPS transmission of DNS queries via DoH ensures confidentiality, recent studies have shown that DNS resolver operators can still correlate queries with clients using IP addresses.
This tracking breaches user privacy and can be exploited commercially
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