Brendan David Polidori
Experimental Analysis of Intentional Radio-Frequency Attacks on GNSS-based Time Synchronization for Communications Networks.
Rel. Fabio Dovis, Alex Minetto. Politecnico di Torino, Corso di laurea magistrale in Ict For Smart Societies (Ict Per La Società Del Futuro), 2021
|
Preview |
PDF (Tesi_di_laurea)
- Tesi
Licenza: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives. Download (50MB) | Preview |
Abstract
Accurate and reliable time synchronization in telecommunication networks is fundamental to ensure the superior performance of upcoming and next-generation paradigms of mobile communications, such as 5G New Radio (NR). In a modern network infrastructure, sub-microsecond synchronization requires a large number of reliable clocks such as Rubidium (Rb) and Cesium (Cs) atomic oscillators, technologies that are too expensive to be deployed throughout multiple network nodes. To overcome the cost problem, atomic clocks are being replaced by less-expensive GNSS receivers that provide a specific synchronization signal, the Pulse Per Second (1-PPS), that can be exploited to distribute time synchronization across the network at more sustainable costs.
However, GNSS receivers expose the network to the growing risk of radio-frequency attacks, thus introducing a significant security flaw
Relatori
Anno Accademico
Tipo di pubblicazione
Numero di pagine
Corso di laurea
Classe di laurea
Aziende collaboratrici
URI
![]() |
Modifica (riservato agli operatori) |
