Andrea Fanti
Protecting Register Spilling in AArch64 Microprocessors.
Rel. Paolo Ernesto Prinetto. Politecnico di Torino, Corso di laurea magistrale in Ingegneria Informatica (Computer Engineering), 2021
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Abstract
Memory-related vulnerabilities can be a serious threat to modern software. Main memory is vulnerable in the way that it is not aware of its contents but instead it is designed following the von-Neumann architecture. In this architecture, the CPU hands over commands to the memory, which executes them by retrieving or writing data from or to the specified location (address). Lack of content-awareness implies that sensitive data cannot be appropriately protected against tampering, unwanted eavesdroppers and the like. Memory security has then to be implemented upstream: for instance, modern operating systems isolate running processes and forbid access of others’ memory sectors.
Unfor- tunately, this is not enough: some programming languages (notably C and C++) do not provide native memory protection features, and memory management and boundary checks are demanded to programmers, who are error-prone
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