Securing Aircraft Engine Control Units: Utilizing Embedded Board Security Features for Enhanced Protection

In the aerospace domain, where the concept of airworthiness and ensuring its continuity is fundamental, securing Engine Control Units (ECUs) is a critical objective to prevent system compromise with potentially catastrophic consequences. This work focuses on the implementation of robust security mechanisms for embedded avionics ECUs by leveraging the advanced hardware security features available on the NXP S32K344 platform, a microcontroller used in both automotive and aerospace applications. By examining this recent Automotive General Purpose ECU, the study demonstrates how embedded system security can be significantly enhanced through the strategic utilization of built-in hardware capabilities. Special emphasis in this work is placed on securing the software image loading process with appropriate verification and authentication and enforcing strict memory protection policies to ensure both the integrity and confidentiality of system data and code exploiting the cryptographic capabilities of the board. The study begins with the modelling of a realistic case study for an avionic ECU, establishing a foundation for subsequent security analyses. A detailed threat assessment follows, adhering to most recent aerospace standards and regulations (e.g. DO-178C, DO-356, AIR7368) and employing frameworks like the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) and the Embedded System Threat Modelling and Mitigation Methodology (EMB3D) to systematically identify and categorize potential vulnerabilities. Next, a comprehensive analysis of the necessary security measures is conducted to obtain adequate countermeasures against each threat condition. The implementation part follows a configuration and deployment strategy for hardware-assisted security mechanisms such as secure boot, cryptographic validation of application image, and memory region protection, features that are not only analyzed in terms of their technical configuration but also evaluated for their effectiveness in mitigating all the threats previously identified. Experimental results confirm that the proposed approach strengthens the ECU’s security reducing the attack surface. The use of on-chip security features contributes to a substantial increase in system resilience without introducing significant performance penalties. In conclusion, this work provides a concrete contribution toward the development of safer and more secure avionics systems by proposing an architecture that exploits the native hardware security features of modern microcontrollers underscoring the critical role of hardware-assisted security in the design of next-generation ECUs.