Lorenzo Giacobbe
Analysis of side-channel leakages on cryptographic circuits.
Rel. Antonio Jose' Di Scala. Politecnico di Torino, Corso di laurea magistrale in Ingegneria Informatica (Computer Engineering), 2022
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Abstract
The security of cryptosystems is usually evaluated using a black-box approach; an adver- sary can access the algorithm only through predefined interfaces, such as the inputs and outputs of the system. In order to be used, those cryptosystems have to be implemented onto a physical circuit. This opens up the possibility for attackers, to use so-called side channels, to obtain additional information about the internal computation of the systems, that are leaked by the circuit. A specific type of Side Channel Attacks (SCA) are Power Analysis Attacks (PAA); using PAA the attacker obtains details about the internal cal- culations performed by the circuit, analyzing its power consumption.
These information are then used to retrieve the secret key
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