Detecting compromise in TEE applications at runtime
Flavio Ciravegna
Detecting compromise in TEE applications at runtime.
Rel. Antonio Lioy, Silvia Sisinni, Enrico Bravi. Politecnico di Torino, Master of science program in Computer Engineering, 2023
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Abstract
The complexity of modern applications poses significant challenges in maintaining system security and trustworthiness. Applications across various domains, ranging from Cloud Computing to the Internet of Things, often rely on processing sensitive data and hence require execution within a secure environment that isolates them from other untrusted applications. As a result, in recent years Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have been developed to offer a secure area where data and code can be securely processed and stored, providing strong isolation guarantees. This thesis focuses specifically on Keystone Enclave, an open-source Trusted Execution Environment framework built upon the RISC-V Instruction Set Architecture. Keystone Enclave aims to address by design the limitations observed in other existing TEE technologies.
This framework provides a set of components that enable the developers to customize the trusted environment, according to the security requirements of the specific domain
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