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Ilkhom Mamayunusov


Rel. Guido Marchetto, Akmal Rustamov. Politecnico di Torino, Corso di laurea magistrale in Mechatronic Engineering (Ingegneria Meccatronica), 2022

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As the Global Position System (GPS) based technology increasingly implemented into the civil applications UAVs, it has been driven by the mass-market that more precise and reliable GPS services are demanded. However, due to the weakness of the GPS signals, the GPS receiver performance could be easily disrupted by anthropogenic disturbances, among which the jamming and spoofing activities are extremely crucial threats. In this paper an preliminary investigation on the effects of the jamming and spoofing disturbances to the mass-market positioning and navigation units integrated in the smartphones and drones is provided. Comparative analysis will be addressed on the performance of drones under the intentional disturbances. Then we use/propose defence system and solving these challenges while running on a network of UAV devices. Because a system relying on GPS positioning to make its next step must comprehend GPS vulnerabilities and recognize threats such as jamming and spoofing, the GPS is now the most extensively used and best known example of a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). Jamming and spoofing devices can be acquired for a modest price on the open market. Software Defined Radio (SDR) technology is also delivering new levels of flexibility and cost-efficiency. The following research questions will be used to investigate this technology: •??Is there a waveform, power, and amplitude combination that will cause the GPS signal to be disrupted? •??Can GPS jamming be done as easily in software as it is in hardware? •??Is GPS spoofing easier to accomplish in software? The study consists of two tests: a GPS jamming test where the focus is to realize what combination of waveform, power and amplitude is able to jam the GPS signal and a GPS spoofing test where a HackRF One is used to fool a UAV. The results from the jamming test have shown that GPS jamming is easy to accomplish using different combinations as GPS signals have low received signal power. The spoofing test proved that it is capable to spoof a UAV with a fairly inexpensive SDR setup and freely available software.

Relators: Guido Marchetto, Akmal Rustamov
Academic year: 2021/22
Publication type: Electronic
Number of Pages: 47
Corso di laurea: Corso di laurea magistrale in Mechatronic Engineering (Ingegneria Meccatronica)
Classe di laurea: New organization > Master science > LM-25 - AUTOMATION ENGINEERING
Aziende collaboratrici: Turin Polytechnic University in Tashkent
URI: http://webthesis.biblio.polito.it/id/eprint/23678
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